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I. INTRODUCTION
In most legal contexts, we have finally arrived at a consensus that
a competent adult woman's expressed desire not to have sex shall be
conclusive on the issue of whether she consented to a sexual contact.
The popular form of this idea is the notion that "no means no."
Unfortunately, there is no similar consensus that "yes means yes."
Instead, there has been much debate about when the expressed
consent of a competent adult to sexual contact should be considered
legally ineffective. Many contend that expressed consent to sexual
relationships between professionals and their patients/clients should
be considered legally ineffective, and that such unions should be
prohibited.' Colleges and universities are now debating the need for
policies that prohibit consensual sexual relationships between
professors and students.'
Although prohibitions on professional-client sexual relation-
ships are ostensibly gender-neutral, most supporters concede that the
intent of the restrictions is to protect women clients from male
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. J.D., Harvard Law School. This article was
supported by a grant awarded by Ohio Northern University, and by the able research and
assistance of Hope Raschke and Chad Ziegler.
1. See, e.g., Linda Jorgenson, Rebecca Randles & Larry Strasburger, The Furor Over Psycho-
therapist-Patient Sexual Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 647-
48 & 672-83 (1991) (noting that sexual relationships between psychotherapists and their patients
are proscribed by the ethical standards of the various professional associations); cf infra part 1V
(discussing the rationale behind those proscriptions); see also Dan S. Murrell,J.L. Bernard, Lisa
K. Coleman, Deborah L. O'Laughlin, & Robert B. Gala, A National Survey of Attorney-Client Sexual
Involvement: Are There Ethical Concerns?, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 483 (1993) (commenting that the
Illinois Disciplinary Commission determined consensual attorney-client relationships did not
constitute misconduct, but that the New Hampshire Committee on Professional Conduct
determined such a scenario was tantamount to misconduct).
2. See infra part II (discussing consensual relationship policies that have been adopted at
various colleges and universities).
269
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
professionals.' The paternalistic character of the restrictions has not
generated much opposition, even though it has been acknowledged
that:
by creating an absolute presumption of harm, the legislature
implicitly decides that a woman "will always be incapable of giving
informed consent to a sexual relationship" once she comes under
the domineering influence of a male professional.4
Instead, the proponents of consensual relationship policies in higher
education enthusiastically endorsed the incapacity argument.
Analogizing students to children molested by parents,5 and to mental
patients undergoing psychotherapy,' proponents claim that there is
no such thing as a consensual relationship between a student and a
professor because students are incapable of giving effective consent.'
This incapacity allegedly arises from a power differential between the
parties' and/or the phenomenon of transference.9
Although this incapacity argument is often attributed to campus
feminists," it is based upon a fundamental distrust of women's
judgment and of their perceptions of their own experience. The
suggestion that otherwise competent adult women are so incapable of
making decisions about their personal lives that colleges and
universities should step in and regulate their sexuality is not an
obviously feminist position. The notion that (predominantly male)
administrators should feel free to ignore a woman's own perceptions
and stated preferences about her life and her exercise of her own
sexuality is deeply anti-feminist. Further, if consent given within a
relationship where there is a power imbalance is routinely considered
ineffective, the sexual autonomy of women will be severely restricted.
Life occurs under conditions of inequality. Only a small subset of
power imbalances are extreme enough to vitiate consent. F e m a I e
university students are in the process of increasing their power rating
3. Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment, Professional-Client Sex: Is Criminal Liability an Appropriate
Means of Enforcing Professional Responsibit?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1275, 1322-23 (1993).
4. Id. at 1323 (citations omitted).
5. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (contending that both professor-student
sexual relations and child molestation are acts of domination).
6. See generally infra part IV (asserting that regulations that are reasonable in the psycho-
therapeutic environment are also necessary in the higher education environment).
7. See generally infra part IV (explaining that where power differentials exist, there can be
no mutual consent).
8. See infra notes 111-122 and accompanying text (describing the role disparity between
professor and student).
9. See infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (analyzing the psychoanalytic phenome-
non in the professor-student context).
10. Laura Mansnerus, Colleges Break Up Dangerous Liaisons, N.Y. TiMm, Apr. 7, 1991, § 4A,
at 34.
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in society. They graduate into a world where they will have to
function effectively, both personally and professionally, under
conditions of power inequality. What these students want and deserve
is equality of opportunity and equality of respect, not protection from
decisions that others deem unwise. A university or law school truly
concerned about enhancing the educational and professional
opportunities of its women students can more effectively use the
institutional resources currently consumed in the exercise of drafting,
debating and enforcing sex codes. It is time to get back to the
feminist basics of listening to women, believing women, respecting
women, and empowering women.
Since my own experiences have shaped my views on this subject, it
seems appropriate to explain my situation. I have been a law
professor at a small law school in rural Ohio for eight years. I do not
date students. My university recently adopted a complete ban on
sexual relationships between faculty and students." I am generally
opposed to governmental, corporate, or institutional regulation of
private conduct.
By far, the most important influence on my views is the respect I
have developed over the years for the extraordinary women who come
to my university to study law. Ranging in age from twenty-two to over
sixty, they have brought an incredible diversity of life experience to
their studies. Many of our students are non-traditional students,
coming to law school after careers as nurses, soldiers, teachers, and
construction workers. One woman was a "military wife" who
graduated with honors from the University of Pennsylvania in the
1940s, then moved with her husband to posts around the world.
Another was a soldier who served in the Gulf War.
Some are women who found the courage to leave an abusive
relationship, and others are single mothers struggling to make a life
for themselves and their children. All are bright, determined,
ambitious people who threw what they could into a car and headed
for a strange place to wrestle with the complexity of the law. They
were not deterred by the obstacles behind them, and they were not
deterred by the prospect of attending a school with a predominantly
male student body and a predominantly male faculty, on their way to
a career in a predominantly male profession. These women want to
be lawyers because they want to make a difference in the world. As
11. OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY, FACULTYHANDBOOK 1995-96 [hereinafter OHIO NORTHERN
UNIVERSITY] § 2.3(3) (H), at 14-15 (1995) ("Faculty and staff members should not have sexual
relations with students to whom they are not married.").
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mothers, soldiers, and nurses, many have been responsible for life and
death decisions in the past. As lawyers, they will all be responsible for
decisions that affect their clients' most treasured rights-their liberty,
their property, the custody of their children. It seems to me that
those who contend that such women are no more capable of deciding
who to date than children or mental patients bear a heavy burden of
persuasion. The proponents of consensual relationship policies have
not carried that burden.
II. THE PROLIFERATION OF CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP POLICIES
Consensual relationship policies are a relatively recent development
in higher education. The first consensual relationship policies were
adopted in the mid-1980s.'2 By the mid-1990s, the popular press was
reporting that a growing number of institutions were considering
similar policies. 3 Leading professional organizations have urged
colleges and universities to consider discouraging romantic relation-
ships between professors and students, 4 and to adopt policies
declaring such relationships unprofessional. 5 The Association of
American Law Schools has issued a statement declaring sexual
relationships between professors and students inappropriate in some
circumstances. 6 A growing professional literature describes the
consensual relationship policies of various institutions.17
Most institutions do not have any formal restrictions on consensual
relationships.'" It should be noted, however, that the lack of a
12. SeeFrances L. Hoffimann, Sexual Harassment in Academia: Feminist Theory and Institutional
Practice, 56 HARv. EDUC. REV. 105, 111-12 (1986) (discussing policies adopted by Harvard
University and the University of California). See also infra notes 17-19.
13. SeeJim Morrison, U-Va. Faculty Bans Sex With Students: Proposed Rule Awaits President's
Approval WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1993, at B1.
14. American Council on Education (ACE), Sexual Harassment on Campus: A Policy and
Program on Deterrence, reprinted in THE EDUCATOR'S GUIDE TO CONTROLLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
app. V at 115 (Thompson Publishing Group 1993) [hereinafter THE EDUCATOR'S GUIDE].
15. National Education Association, Policies on Sexual Harassment and Personal Relationships
in Higher Education, reprinted in THE EDUCATOR'S GUIDE, app. V at 129 (stating that the National
Education Association "urges its affiliates in institutions of higher education to establish strong
policies declaring such relationships unprofessional").
16. Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional
Responsibilities inASSOCIATION OFAMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 1995 HANDBOOK 89 [hereinafterASS'N
OF AM. LAW SCH.] (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. 1995).
17. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 845 (1988) (discussing consensual relationship policies at the University of
Iowa, Temple University, Hampshire College, the University of Minnesota, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Harvard University and the University of Michigan); Peter DeChiara,
The Need for Universities to Have Rules on Consensual Sexual Relationships Between Faculty Members and
Students, 21 CoLuM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 137, 145-47 (1988) (discussing the policies at Harvard
and the University of Iowa); and Hoffmann, supra note 12.
18. DeChiara, supra note 17, at 138.
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formal prohibition does not mean that such relationships are
considered unproblematic by the institution. Most universities have
rather vague policies, forbidding "unethical behavior" or "conduct
unbecoming a member of the faculty" or even "moral turpitude", that
can be invoked to punish professors who participate in romantic
relationships with students that the university later decides were
inappropriate.19 In fact, the only reported case upholding sanctions
imposed upon a faculty member for engaging in a consensual
relationship with a student involved an institution that did not have
a consensual relationship policy.2"
The policies that have been adopted are far from uniform, but
there are a few dominant variations. One type of policy attempts to
discourage faculty-student relationships, but does not forbid them.
The University of Minnesota Policy on Consensual Relationships,2
for example, states that faculty-student relationships "while not
expressly forbidden, are generally deemed very unwise."22  The
policy warns professors that it considers a professor's power to "greatly
diminish the student's actual freedom of choice,"23 and that if a
charge of harassment is subsequently lodged it will be "exceedingly
difficult" for the professor to prove consent.24 Similarly, the Univer-
sity of Michigan's Faculty Guidelines warn that sexual relationships
between faculty members and students are "potentially exploitative
and should be avoided."2  The Code of Conduct of the University
of California Santa Cruz prohibits only unwelcome relationships, but
urges individuals in positions of "power/authority/control over
others" to examine such relationships "in terms of emotional health,
19. DeChiara, supra note 17, at 145 (noting that in 1987, a survey of 38 universities across
the country revealed that only two prohibited consensual faculty-student relationships).
20. See Naragon v. Wharton, 572 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. La. 1983), affld 737 F.2d 1403 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that the University's decision to remove a female instructor from teaching
duties because of her relationship with a female student was lawful even though no university
policy prohibited consensual relationships and the University did not punish similar relationships
between male faculty and female students. The Court held that the action of the University was
not discriminatory because "each case of teacher misconduct and its resulting effect on the
mission of the University must be considered on its own."). The scarcity of cases on this subject
may indicate that universities are more interested in adopting consensual relationships policies
than they are in enforcing them. On the other hand, it may simply demonstrate that where the
relationship is truly consensual, complaints are unlikely. At any rate, it would appear that sexual
exploitation of students is not as common as proponents suggest.
21. The University of Minnesota, Policy on ConsensalRelations, reprinted in THE EDUCATOR'S
GUIDE, app. V at 275.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Chamallas, supra note 17, at 845.
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self-esteem, and respect for the independence of the persons
involved" before engaging in them.
26
The policies of the University of Minnesota, University of Michigan,
and the University of Santa Cruz do not forbid conduct that the
faculty and/or administration has determined is problematic enough
to discourage. These policies do not clarify what, if any, sanctions
may be imposed upon a faculty member who engages in the
discouraged behavior. Finally, they do not appear to be limited to
situations where the professor has some direct academic responsibility
for the student, and they do not explain the rationale for dis-
couraging relationships outside the instructional context.
The NewYork University Law School (NYU) adopted an interesting
variation on the "discourage but don't forbid" policies." In addition
to a set of anti-bias rules that can be enforced with formal sanctions,
NYU has promulgated a set of "aspirational standards" that are
"promoted only through active education and enforced only through
voluntary mediation."" One aspirational standard:
creates a presumption that sexual relations are not consensual when
they are entered into by two people, one of whom exercises power
conveyed by the law school, over the other. The presumption
applies to teaching assistants, journal editors, and instructors, as
well as to professors. It does not prohibit sexual relations, but
rather places upon the more powerful party the burden for
assuring that the relation truly is consensual.'
This policy is an improvement because it is explicit about the lack of
formal sanctions, and offers instead a mediation process that may
actually resolve disputes rather than exacerbate them. It also appears
to be unique in suggesting that some relationships between students
are potentially exploitative.
The more common policies forbid faculty-student relationships only
where the professor has direct academic responsibility for the student.
These policies may be characterized as conflict-of-interest policies.
They generally apply where the professor assigns grades to the
student, serves as an academic advisor, or is in a position to supervise
or evaluate the student's work as a teaching assistant, research
26. PHYLLIS FRANKLIN, HELENE MOGLEN, PHYLUS ZATLIN-BORING & RUTH ANGRESS, SEXUAL
AND GENDER HARASSMENT IN THE ACADEMY: A GUIDE FOR FACULTY, STUDENTS, AND AD-
MINISTRATORS 36 (1981).
27. Sylvia A. Law, Good Intentions Are Not Enough: An Agenda on Gender for Law School Deans,
77 IoWA L. REv. 79, 85 (1991) (remarking that the NYU policy does not prohibit sexual
relations, but rather places the burden of proving consent on the party with more power).
28. Id. at 85.
29. Id.
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assistant, or similar position. The National Education Association's
policy belongs in this category,3" as do the policies adopted by
Harvard," the University of California, 2 Temple,33 Tufts,3 4 and
the University of Virginia."
A third type of policy forbids consensual relationships where they
pose a conflict of interest, and discourages them in the absence of a
direct conflict. The best example of such a policy is the Consensual
Relationship Policy of the University of Iowa.36 The conflict of
interest portion of the policy is exemplary for its clarity. "No faculty
member shall have an amorous relationship (consensual or otherwise)
with a student who is enrolled in a course being taught by the faculty
member or whose academic work (including work as a teaching
assistant) is being supervised by the faculty member."37
The University of Iowa policy also explains the rationale behind the
prohibition. The policy states that when a faculty member has
professional responsibility for a student, amorous relationships are
wrong because there is a possibility that the faculty member will abuse
his or her power and sexually exploit the student. Given the imbal-
ance of power in such a relationship, a student's voluntary consent is
suspect. This unprofessional behavior places the faculty member in
a position to show favoritism and implicitly makes benefits contingent
on sexual favors. If faculty members engage in amorous relations with
students who are subject to their supervision, it will be viewed as
unethical by the University even when it appears that the student
consented to the relationship."
Unfortunately, when the policy discusses relationships outside the
instructional context both the precision and the justifications are left
behind. The reader is warned that relationships outside the instruc-
tional context "may lead to difficulties,"39 "particularly when the
faculty member and student are in the same academic unit or in units
30. National Education Association, supra note 15, app. V at 129 (stating that the
Association "believes that sexual relationships between a faculty member and a student currently
enrolled in the faculty member's course, or under the supervision or direction of the faculty
member, are unprofessional").
31. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 111.
32. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 111.
33. Elaine D. Ingulli, Sexual Harassment in Education, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 281, n.1 (1987).
34. Morrison, supra note 13, at B7.
35. Morrison, supra note 13, at B7.
36. The University of Iowa, Policy on Sexual Harazsment and Consensual Relationships, reprinted
in THE EDUCATOR'S GUIDE, app. V at 271.
37. The University of Iowa, supra note 36, at § 7.
38. The University of Iowa, supra note 36, at § 6(b).
39. The University of Iowa, supra note 36, at § 8.
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that are academically allied."4°  The only rationale given for the
warning is that "relationships that the parties view as consensual may
appear to others to be exploitative."41 It is not clear what, if any,
sanctions will be applied where the relationship occurs outside the
instructional context.
In another example of this kind of policy, the Statement on
Consensual Relationships of the University of Wisconsin-Madison
requires that conflicts of interest be resolved. The policy then warns
that consensual relationships "may cause serious consequences even
when conflicts of interest are resolved."4 1 In listing the consequen-
ces, the policy observes that alleged consent may not be an effective
defense to a charge of sexual harassment, and that consensual
relationships may be outside the scope of employment. The
defendant may, therefore, not be covered by the state's liability
protection in the event of litigation.43 The Association of American
Law Schools' policy deems faculty-student relationships inappropriate
where the professor has a professional responsibility for the student,
but only suggests that the professor be "sensitive to the perceptions
of other students" when dating a student outside the instructional
context.
44
The final option is to prohibit sexual relationships between faculty
and students altogether. The Consensual Relationship Policy at Ohio
Northern University simply states that "faculty and staff members
should not have sexual relations with students to whom they are not
married."'
Although only a handful of institutions have adopted consensual
relationship policies, the fact that they are being so widely debated
indicates that there must be some problem that these policies are
intended to address. Part III examines the perceived problems that
have begun to generate relationship policies in institutions of higher
education.
40. The University of Iowa, supra note 36, app. V at 271.
41. The University of Iowa, supra note 36, app. V at 271.
42. The University of Wisconsin-Madison, Statement on Consensual Relationships, reprinted in
THE EDUCATOR'S GuiDE, app. V at 281.
43. Id.
44. ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCH., supra note 16, at 89.
45. OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY, supra note 11, at 14-15; see alsoJerome W.D. Stokes & D.
Frank Vmik, Consensual Sexual Relations Between Faculty and Students in HigherEducation, 96 EDUC.
LAW REP. 899 (1995) (noting that University of Virginia, William & Mary, University of Texas
at Arlington, and University of Washington considered complete bans on faculty-student
relationships but the proposals were defeated).
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III. CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP POLICIES: WHO NEEDS THEM?
Consensual relationship policies evolved out of institutional efforts
to meet the statutory duty to eliminate sex discrimination from higher
education.46 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance...47
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson," the United States Supreme
Court held that sex discrimination in employment occurs where a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate.49 In Franklin v. Gwinnet
County Public Schools,5" the Court held that sexual harassment of a
student by a teacher constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX. 15
The rationale for treating sexual harassment as sex discrimination
was well-stated by an early commentator, Ronna Greff Schneider.
Schneider explained that it is essential to intellectual growth and
development that a student be in a nondiscriminatory environ-
ment. 2 A sexually abusive environment prevents a student from
obtaining the most from an academic program and inhibits him or
her from developing his or her intellectual potential. Loss of an
academic benefit on the basis of sex violates Title IXs
Students aggrieved by a violation of Title IX have a private cause of
action against the offending institution,54 and can recover damages
as well as equitable relief.5 Institutions subject to the requirements
of Title IX must adopt and publish policies that define and prohibit
46. See Elisabeth A. Keller, Consensual Amorous Relationships Between Faculty and Students: The
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 15 J.C. & U.L. 21, 22 (1988) (recounting that the university
community is aware of the serious effects of sexual harassment and the potential for sexual
exploitation).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
48. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
49. Id. at 64.
50. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
51. Id. at 75.
52. Ronna GreffSchneider, SexualHarassment and HigherEducation, 65 TEx. L. REv. 525,551
(1987) (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 551 (citations omitted).
54. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding that a female who was
denied admission to medical schools had a right under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 to pursue a private cause action against the universities).
55. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72 (holding that a damage remedy was available to a high school
student who brought a Title IX action for alleged intentional gender-based discrimination by
a coach-teacher).
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sexual harassment, as well as grievance procedures, to resolve student
complaints of sexual harassment.56
In defining sexual harassment in the context of higher education,
many institutions have looked to guidelines issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Conduct constitutes sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is a condition of a
person's employment, (2) a person's submission to or rejection of
such conduct is used as the basis for employment decisions, or (3) the
conduct creates a hostile work environment or has the purpose or
effect of hindering an individual's work performance. 8
The same principles apply when evaluating whether a person has
been subjected to sexual harassment in an educational setting.59 In
an educational setting, quid pro quo harassment can occur when a
professor conditions some academic benefit-a grade, a job, a
recommendation-on sexual favors. The conduct may consist of a
threat to give a lower grade than the grade the student earned if she
does not comply with the demand, or an offer to give a higher grade
than the one she earned if she does comply. Unwelcome sexual
advances not accompanied by threats or promises may create a hostile
environment that impairs a student's academic performance.
Students other than the student directly harassed by the professor also
may have a hostile environment claim if they are injured by the
conduct. For instance, other students may be disadvantaged in the
competition for some scarce benefit or concerned that their grades
will also be conditioned on meeting the illegitimate demands of a
professor.
Virtually every institution of higher learning in the United States
now has a policy forbidding sexual harassment and providing a
procedure for resolving claims that harassment has occurred.'
Legal liability aside, no institution has any interest in condoning,
much less promoting, the kind of conduct prohibited by Title IX.
Once an institution has a sexual harassment policy in place, however,
56. Patricia L. Winks, Legal Implications of Sxual Contact Between Teacher and Student, 11J.L.
& EDUC. 437, 467 (1982).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (stating that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex in employment).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1988).
59. Waiter B. Connolly, Jr. & Alison B. Marshall, Saual Harassment of University or College
Students by Faculty Members, 15J.C. & U.L. 381, 387 (1989).
60. But see DeChiara, supra note 17, at 146 (noting that in 1987, Brigham Young University,
Butler University, University of Connecticut, and Rice University did not have sexual harassment
policies).
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is it desirable to go beyond the prohibition on sexual harassment and
forbid consensual relationships as well?
Consensual relationships, by definition, fall outside Title IX's
prohibition of sexual conduct that is "unwelcome." Therefore,
banning consensual relationships should not have any impact on the
institution's legal liability. So why try to regulate them? One
potential benefit is that by prohibiting such unions altogether, the
institution can avoid situations where relationships that were
consensual at one point become occasions for harassment, or false
allegations of harassment, when the companionship ends.61 Further,
a complete ban may eliminate cases of "unintentional coercion,"
where the professor does not intend to coerce the student, but the
student nevertheless feels coerced.62 Another possible benefit is
eliminating the need to resolve disputes over whether a relationship
was in fact consensual.63 Finally, banning such relationships can cut
down on favoritism or a perception of favoritism by other students.'
None of these potential benefits, however, justify a complete
prohibition of consensual unions. If the conduct is unwelcome, it is
already prohibited by any sexual harassment policy. This is true
regardless of whether similar conduct may have been welcome at
another time, or whether the professor intended to harass or coerce
the student. If the student is aggrieved, the student is entitled to
relief.65 There is no need to ban consensual relationships to
accomplish this result.
In addition, the resolution of credibility disputes through sexual
harassment procedures is no more difficult than the resolution of
credibility disputes in other cases of alleged academic misconduct.
Adoption of a consensual relationship policy would still require the
resolution of disputes about whether the alleged relationship in fact
took place. Therefore, the potential elimination of credibility
61. See DeChiara, supra note 17, at 143.
62. See DeChiara, supra note 17, at 142 (quoting Tuana in Sexual Harassment in Academe:
Issues of Power and Coercion, 33 COLLEGE TEACHING 53, 61 (1985)) (noting that even where it
appears a student is consenting to a relationship with a professor, factors such as fear may
actually force the student into the relationship).
63. SeeDeChiara, supra note 17, at 142 (explaining that the pressure a student may feel to
enter a relationship with a professor may invalidate any appearance of consent, therefore,
resolving such disputes is difficult).
64. See DeChiara, supra note 17, at 144-45 (noting that even consensual teacher-student
relationships can lead to problems of favoritism).
65. For a discussion of the relief available to aggrieved students and the grievance proce-
dures for individual universities and colleges, seeFRANKLIN, MOGLEN, ZATLIN-BORING &ANGRESS,
supra note 26, at app.; Ingulli, supra note 33, at apps. A-F; and Schneider, supra note 52, at 572-
74.
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disputes is not a persuasive justification for the adoption of the
policies.
One concern that is arguably addressed by consensual relationship
policies is the problem of favoritism. Institutions of higher education
have a legitimate interest in preserving both the appearance and the
fact of academic integrity. A sexual relationship between a professor
and a student for whom that professor has academic responsibility
generates at least the appearance of impropriety. Although the
professor may not promise or intend any quid pro quo, the student
may anticipate academic benefits or fear academic reprisals. Further,
the potential for unconscious bias on the part of the professor, and
speculation and resentment on the part of other students, justify
institutional intervention.6 Perceptions of favoritism are most likely
and most harmful where there is a conflict of interest. Institutional
requirements that professors eliminate potential conflicts of interest
are clearly legitimate and have been widely adopted. 7 Prohibitions
of consensual relationships where there is no conflict of interest are
needlessly intrusive and serve no legitimate purpose.
The final justification asserted for prohibiting consensual relation-
ships is that such relationships are inherently harmful to the
students.' Proponents of consensual relationship bans argue that
such relationships are always harmful to the student because, no
matter what the student may believe, no affiliation between a
professor and a student is ever truly consensual.69 In support of that
66. SeeDeChiara, supra note 17, at 145 (stating that favoritism or the perception of favorit-
ism can cause other students to be resentful, demoralized or hostile, and to "lose faith that
academic rewards are distributed by merit") (citations omitted); see also Chamallas, supra note
17, at 856 (stating that even if the student involved in the relationship has not been coerced,
the "message transmitted to other [students] may be coercive and threatening") (citations
omitted).
67. See DeChiara, supra note 17, at 147 (commenting that the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Brown University and the University of California have policies that warn teachers
who are sexually involved with students to be aware of"potential conflicts of interest") (citations
omitted). But see Paul Kidd, Professor-Student Sex "Never Appropriate" Rights Hearing Told, THE
TORONTO STAR, July 9, 1993, at A2 (quoting the testimony of Michele Paludi, psychology
professor at Hunter College in New York, who stated that for a professor to just declare that
there is a conflict of interest if he/she enters a sexual relationship with a student is inadequate).
68. See DeChiara, supra note 17, at 138 (arguing that "consensual sexual relationships be-
tween a teacher and student may in some cases be harmful to the interests of the student
involved, unfair to other students, and bad for the academic process").
69. See Phyllis Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair Advantage of the
"Fair" Sex, 53 ABANY L. REV. 95, 119 (1988) (declaring that even when a student seems to
consent to a sexual relationship with her professor, the consent is inherently suspect because
of the "power dependency" relationship; thus, a fiduciary duty has been breached by the
professor); Winks, supra note 56, at 444 (stating that a "teacher's exploitation of his student is
no less present when the association is consensual").
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position, proponents contend that students are incapable of giving
effective consent to a sexual relationship with a professor.7
0
IV. DIsPARITy OF POWER AND THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT
The question of whether professionals should abstain from sexual
relationships with clients has generated a significant amount of
scholarly commentary.7' It has become common to advocate bans
on these relationships in a variety of professional settings, without
much reflection about whether the situations are actually similar.
This "onejustification-fits-all" fallacy explains the excesses of many of
those who would ban consensual relationships in higher education
without any evidence of either coercion or conflict of interest. A
more contextual analysis suggests that regulations that are reasonable
in a psychotherapeutic environment are needlessly restrictive in the
very different environment of higher education.72
One author who considers many different professional relationships
to present problems similar enough to call for a single solution states
her thesis succinctly:
An adult's choice to enter into a sexual relationship with another
consenting adult is ordinarily a matter of private rather than legal
concern. Sexual contact occurring within certain human relation-
ships, however, falls on a continuum of a presumption of
exploitation due to what might be called "power dependency."
Specifically these relationships include parent-child,
psychotherapist-patient, physician-patient, clergy-penitent, professor-
student, attorney-client, and employer-employee... '[C] onsent' to
a sexual relationship obtained in such a power dependency
70. See infra notes 108-134 and accompanying text (evaluating the theory that students are
incapable of consenting to a sexual relationship with a professor).
71. For a discussion of therapist-patient relationships, see infra notes 78-107 and accompany-
ing text (analogizing the relationship to that of a parent and child because of the power the
therapist has over the patient and because the patient often goes through transference). For
a discussion of professor-student relationships, see infra notes 111-127 and accompanying text
(arguing that a ban on sexual relations does not make sense when the professor does not have
direct supervision over the student because there is not the same threat of coercion or
favoritism). For a discussion of attorney-client relationships, see, e.g., Margit Livingston, When
Libido Subverts Credo: Regulation of Attone,Client Sexual Relations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 5 (1993);
John M. O'Connell, Keeping Sex Out of the Attorne)-Client Relationship: A Proposed Rule, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 887 (1992). For a discussion of literature concerning doctor-patient relationships, see,
e.g., Mary Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 291 (1994); Tanya Dobash, Physician Patient Sexual Contact: The Battle Between the State and
the Medical Profession, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1725 (1993). For clergy-penitent relationships, see,
BREACH OF TRUST: SExuAL EXPLOITATION BY HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND CLERGY (John
C. Gonsiorek, ed., SAGE Publications) (1995).
72. See Coleman, supra note 69, at 119-20 (commenting that the professor-student relation-
ship is distinguishable from psychotherapist-patient sexual relationships).
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relationship is inherently suspect and therefore should be legally
ineffective.73
Another author similarly describes sexual relationships between "a
man and a woman who have a professional relationship based on
trust, specifically when the man is the woman's doctor,
psychotherapist, pastor, lawyer, teacher, or workplace mentor" as "sex
in the forbidden zone."74 Without discussing the possibility that the
dynamics of the various relationships on his list might be dissimilar,
he proceeds to discuss the "forbidden zone" in terms more ap-
propriate to his own professional specialty as a therapist than the
average encounter between a woman and her professor or workplace
mentor. Consider the following:
The forbidden zone is a condition of relationship in which sexual
behavior is prohibited because a man holds in trust the intimate,
wounded, vulnerable or undeveloped parts of a woman. The trust
derives from the professional role of the man.., and it creates an
expectation that whatever parts of herself the woman entrusts to
him (her property, body, mind or spirit) must be used solely to
advance her interests and will not be used to his advantage, sexual
or otherwise.75
In such situations, power, trust, and dependency work together to
make it impossible for a woman to freely consent, or effectively
withhold consent. Therefore, any sexual contact is improper
regardless of who initiates it or how willing the parties appear.76
These sentiments have gained wide acceptance in the context of the
psychotherapeutic relationship. They are probably appropriate in that
context. The question is whether they can be imported into other
relationships without losing their justification. The following sections
explore that question.
A. Sexual Relationships Between Therapists and Their Patients
Our society has developed a broad consensus that children are
incapable of giving effective consent to sex.77 When arguing that the
apparent consent of an adult is equally suspect, it is common to
analogize the adult's situation to that of a child, faced with a demand
from an important and powerful person in their life. Proponents of
73. Coleman, supra note 69, at 95-96 (citations omitted) (exploring what the author terms
.power dependency relationships"; this article proposes that sexual contact between certain
people is inherently exploitive).
74. Pn'ER RuTrmR, SEX IN THE FORBIDDEN ZoNE 22-23 (1989).
75. Id. at 25.
76. Id.
77. See generally Coleman, supra note 69, at 100-03.
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restrictions on sexual relationships between therapists and their
patients have been quite explicit in suggesting the "childlike" quality
of patients. For example, "[m]ost clients are vulnerable when they
enter therapy.. . . Struggling with their private crises, many clients are
in a helpless, almost childlike position in relation to the therapist.
The therapist often becomes a parental-type caretaker, exercising a
power over the patient similar to a parent's power over a child."'8
Another commentator is even more emphatic:
In short, the woman patient at such moments is in a state of
psychological regression-a retreat into a childhood state not only
emotionally, but also intellectually. At that moment she becomes
the helpless child again, reliving the experiences from the past,
unable to cope with what is happening to her, feeling robbed of
the ability to make choices, perceiving herself as small and weak
and therefore unable to defend herself, hoping that whatever she
is caught up in will represent an expression of love instead of the
hate such patients remember from the past.'
The woman is thus "led into a mesmerized state that precludes her
from coming to terms realistically with what is happening."80 Thus,
a patient who is in therapy for treatment of emotional or
psychological problems is presumed incapable of granting valid
consent, which is characterized as "clinically impossible" given the
knowledge and power of the therapist."
But what is the basis for the contention that the adult patient is so
much like a child that she has lost the capacity to consent to a sexual
relationship? One possibility is that her illness renders her peculiarly
susceptible to over-reaching or, perhaps, even legally incompetent.
The problem with this argument is that in many cases it is quite clear
that the woman is not legally incompetent. People can be vulnerable,
fearful, anxious or depressed without facing involuntary commitment.
Patients are not ordinarily deemed incompetent to consent to a long
and expensive course of treatment, or so impaired that their lack of
78. Seegenerally, LindaJorgenson & Rebecca M. Randles, Time Out: The Statute of Limitations
andFduciary Theory in Psychotherapist Sexual Misconduct Cases, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 181,203-22 (1991)
(citations omitted) (expressing the belief that fiduciary responsibility should be applied to
psychotherapist misconduct cases as the basis for tolling the statute of limitations because victims
are often unable to prosecute claims within the period allowed by most states).
79. SYDNEY ShmI, The Seduction of the Female Patient, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 58 (Glenn 0. Gabbard ed. 1989).
80. Id
81. See Laurie A. Morin, Civil Remedies for Therapist-Patient Sexual Exploitation, 19 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 401, 418 (1990) (explaining that courts often have reasoned that a patient is
incapable of both granting and withholding consent from a therapist; thus, the courts have
found therapists liable for evading their duty to avoid sexual relations with their patients).
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contractual capacity renders the fee agreement unenforceable. s2
Further, there is no suggestion that the patient would be incapable of
giving valid consent to sexual relations with someone other than the
therapist.83 Therefore, the incapacity cannot be attributable to the
woman's condition alone. Perhaps the incapacity is attributable to
some characteristic of the therapist, or to the dynamics of the
therapeutic relationship.
84
Many commentators contend that the "power" of a therapist
precludes valid consent by a patient to a sexual relationship. The
factors most relevant to a therapist's power over his patient are
knowledge, charismatic personal qualities, and status.8 5 To the
extent that the therapist's status is attributed to something other than
his professional knowledge or the personal information revealed by
the patient, it appears to be simply a matter of his age and gender, 6
and his membership in a prestigious profession.87 As before, these
characteristics are apparently only relevant in combination with
others, because there is no suggestion that women patients are
incapable of consenting to sex with any other man, or with any other
high income or high status man.
As for the effect of the therapist's special knowledge, this too would
appear to be only one factor among several rather than decisive in
itself. It is often the case that one must rely on the specialized
knowledge or skill of another. The patient relies on the therapist to
provide the assistance she needs in resolving her emotional or
psychological problems. The patient also relies, though, upon the
optician to make emergency repairs when she breaks her glasses, and
upon the mechanic when the brakes on her car become unsafe.
Clearly, it would be wrong for the professional to extort sexual favors
as a condition of providing the needed service. Yet, it would be
difficult to convince most people that the special knowledge and
professional status of an optician or a mechanic is so overwhelming
that it vitiates consent when a female customer chooses to have sex
with him.
82. See Patricia M. L. Illingworth, Patient-Therapist Sex: riminalization and its Discontents, 11
J. CONTEmP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 317, 397-98 (1955).
83. Id.
84. See generally Coleman, supra note 69, at 95; Illingworth, supra note 82, at 396;Jorgenson
& Randles, supra note 78, at 189; Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 78, at 189; Jorgenson,
Randles & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 651; Thomas L. Schaffer, Undue Influence, Confidential
Relationship, and the Psychology of Transference, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 197, 197 (1970).
85. Dobash, supra note 71, at 1733 (commenting that these three powers work together and
enhance each other).
86. Dobash, supra note 71, at 1734.
87. Dobash, supra note 71, at 1734.
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If neither the characteristics of the patient nor the characteristics
of the therapist can justify the notion that the patient is incapable of
consenting to a sexual relationship, the key to that theory must lie in
the nature of the therapeutic relationship.a In fact, it is the nature
of the relationship that provides much of the basis for the assertion
that the patient is "vulnerable." 9 The dynamics of the relationship
are also used to explain the "power" that the therapist holds over the
patient." It is the process of therapy that undermines the ability of
the patient to give effective consent to a sexual relationship with the
therapist.9 Key elements in that process include "the client's initial
vulnerability, the therapist's control of the environment, confiden-
tiality, client intimacy, and unilateral self-revelation."92
The most relevant aspect of the therapeutic relationship, however,
is the development and professional handling of the "transference
phenomenon."93 Transference has been defined as the "process by
which clients attribute to the neutral, objective psychoanalyst
'unfinished business' from past relationships with significant
others."94 Transference is the heart of the psychoanalytic method.
"A patient in transference 'unconsciously attributes to the psychiatrist
or analyst those feelings which he may have repressed towards his own
parents .... It is through the creation, experiencing and resolution
of those feelings that [the patient] becomes well."'95
88. SeeJorgenson, Randles, & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 651-53 (discussing the dynamics
of the therapist-patient relationship).
89. SeeJorgenson, Randles, & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 662 (discussing why patients who
are in therapy are vulnerable to sexual exploitation).
90. See Dobash, supra note 71, at 1732 (contending that physicians wield three types of
power. superior knowledge, charisma, and social and cultural power); Jorgenson & Randies,
supranote 78, at 194 (arguing that "sexual contactwith clients constitutes misuse of a therapist's
power").
91. SeeJorgenson, Randles & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 652-57 (stating that the patient's
initial vulnerability, the required self-revelation, and the transference phenomenon are all
aspects of the therapeutic process that undercut the validity of patient consent). But see
Illingworth, supranote 82, at 396 (disagreeing with the position of some that patients are unable
to consent to sex with the therapist; the author states that by assuming patients are unable to
make such decisions just because they are seeking mental health treatment exacerbates the
negative stereotypes patients already face).
92. Jorgenson & Randies, supra note 78, at 194.
93. SeeJorgenson, Randies & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 653-57 (discussing the role of
transference in the therapeutic relationship).
94. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 78, at 190-94.
95. Illingworth, supra note 82, at 399 (quoting DONALDJ. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF
PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (1973)) (focusing on malpractice claims and criminal statutes as redress for
sexual exploitation of patients by therapists and analyzing whether patient-therapist sex should
be criminalized).
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
Transference "can provide both the analyst and patient with much
needed data about the patient's psychic life,"96 because the feelings
date from her early childhood and can teach the analyst about this
crucial period in her life.97 Nevertheless, because the repressed
feelings often originate in the relationship between the patient and
her parents, and often manifest themselves as feelings of "love," some
authorities characterize sex between therapists and patients as
"incestuous."98
As a result of the transference, adult patients may attempt to
change the relationship from therapeutic to sexual. Such behavior
is analogous to the "flirtatious" behavior of a daughter with her
father. Nevertheless,just as the father must encourage his daughter
to develop her sexuality without responding to her in an overtly
sexual manner, the psychotherapist must deny the patient sexual
gratification while providing a safe place for exploration of her
sexual nature. 9
Consequently, sexual contact with a patient is a gross mishandling
of the transference.,' A very high percentage of the patients who
engage in sexual relationships with their therapists are harmed by the
experience.'' The harm suffered by the patient is often quite
serious. "Injuries suffered by victims of psychotherapist sexual
exploitation include sexual dysfunction, anxiety disorders, psychiatric
hospitalizations, increased risk of suicide, depression, dissociative
behavior, internalization of feelings of guilt, shame, anger, fear,
confusion, and hatred, and feelings of worthlessness.",0
2
Therapist-patient sex is generally considered professional miscon-
duct 03 It violates the ethical codes of the various professional
associations." In some jurisdictions, therapist-patient sexual
96. Illingworth, supra note 82, at 400 (citing SIGMUND FREUD, THE DYNAMICS OF
TRANSFERENCE 100 (1988)).
97. Illingworth, supra note 82, at 400.
98. Coleman, supra note 69, at 103 (citation omitted).
99. Coleman, supra note 69, at 104 (citations omitted).
100. Jorgenson, Randles, & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 656-57; Morin, supra note 81, at 410-
11.
101. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 78, at 186 (citing Nanette Gartrell,Judith Lewis Her-
man, S.W. Olarte, M. Feldstein & S. Localio, Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National
Surey, I. Prevalence, 143 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 1126, 1128 (1986), which states that 87% of patients
are harmed by sexual contact with their therapist).
102. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 78, at 186 (citations omitted). See alsoJorgenson,
Randles, & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 662 (describing the damage caused to patients by being
sexually exploited by their therapist).
103. See infra notes 105-108.
104. Jorgenson, Randles & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 647-48 (explaining the prohibitive
stance major mental health organizations have taken in response to psychotherapist-patient
sexual relations).
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relations is grounds for denying or revoking professional licenses.105
In other jurisdictions, it is a criminal offense.106 It is also a form of
professional malpractice that can result in tort liability)10 7  These
punitive actions, and the reasons behind them, are often considered
when regulators contemplate taking action against sexual activity
within the context of other professional relationships. For example,
sexual relations between professors and students are often equated
with such relations between therapists and patients. The following
section considers whether this is a fair comparison.
B. Sexual Relationships Between Professors and Students
Proponents of policies forbidding sexual relationships between
professors and students argue that students should be presumed
incapable of giving valid consent to the relationships, just as patients
are presumed incapable of consenting to a sexual relationship with
their therapists. The alleged impossibility of consent is often simply
stated as a fact, with no attempt at proving the truth of the asser-
tion."° "For all the uproar discussions of 'consent' have evoked on
some campuses, it appears to me an absurdly vacuous issue ... ,
Those proponents that do offer an explanation for the student's
alleged incapacity to consent simply appropriate the justifications
offered in the therapist-patient context-disparity of power and
transference. 10 But whatever explanatory force those factors may
have in the therapeutic context, they must be stretched to the point
105. SeeJorgenson, Randles, & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 715-29 (noting that all states
license psychiatrists and psychologists and half of the states have enacted laws that call for
disciplinary action in cases of psychotherapist sexual relations with a patient).
106. SeeJorgenson, Randles & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 672-83 (describing legislation that
prohibits psychotherapist-patient sexual exploitation).
107. SeeJorgenson, Randles & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 684-91 (describing the common
law actions available to victims of sexual exploitation in therapist-patient relationships).
108. See generally Coleman, supra note 69, at 96 (contending that consent in "power depen-
dency" relationships is inherently suspect) (citations omitted); Kidd, supra note 67, at A2
(quoting the testimony of psychology professor Michele Paludi that there is no such thing as a
consensual relationship between a student and a faculty member). The lack of substantiation
has not gone unremarked. See David R. Pichaske, When Students Make Sexual Advances, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUc., Feb. 24, 1995, at B1 (claiming that such statements, "[I]ike mantras, owe their
power more to frequent chanting than to powerful analysis").
109. BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS xviii (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR]
(attempting to bring sexual harassment in higher education to the forefront, the authors discuss
the environment of higher education, myths about college women, the developmental patterns
of male professors, and the professional dilemmas of female faculty that contribute to the
problem).
110. See infra notes 120-122 and 128-133 and accompanying text (arguing that where a
teacher is not in a position to evaluate the student, there are not the same problems of coercion
or harassment; proponents of bans on teacher-student relationships argue, however, that
transference still occurs because trust is a primary element of the relationship).
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of absurdity in order to explain a similar incapacity in the context of
higher education.
In discussing the disparity of power between a professor and a
student, it is important to consider whether the professor has direct
academic responsibility for the student."' As noted above,
regulations designed to eliminate conflicts of interest are ap-
propriate.1 2 Where the professor is not responsible for evaluating
the student, however, the "coercion" argument becomes quite weak.
In expanding their proposal to ban relationships in the absence of
professional supervision, " 3 proponents of consensual relationship
policies go even further than professional societies and state legis-
latures in regulating private relationships. Those rules only forbid
therapists from having sex with their own patients.
Proponents of the educational relationship policies tend to offer
arguments that may be sensible in the instructional context, but are
far less convincing outside that context. They often neglect to specify
whether their proposals are to be confined to instructional situations
or applied across the board. 4 For example, one proponent states
that "[s] tudents are keenly aware of their vulnerability to the broad
discretionary powers of faculty."" 5 Coercion to comply with sexual
advances by faculty is potentially present because students are unsure
of the consequences of noncompliance. "Therefore, what may appear
to be an adult, consensual, private relationship may be the product of
implicit or explicit duress, and thus, may constitute the basis for
111. Coleman, supra note 69, at 126; Keller, supra note 46, at 40-41.
112. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing conflict of interest policies as
opposed to complete bans).
113. It should be noted that not all of the proponents of consensual relationship policies
urge a ban. One author suggests that the rationale for banning relationships disappears outside
the instructional context. Keller, supra note 46, at 40-41. Others never directly address the
point, but their proposals are not explicitly limited to the instructional context; see, e.g.,
ChamalIas, supra note 17, at 858-59 (arguing that there are articulable reasons for banning
sexual relations of teachers and students or employers and employees even when there is no
direct supervision); Winks, supra note 56, at 444 (explaining that women are in an inferior
position to men in the academic hierarchy and, thus, an egalitarian relationship is never
possible). But other commentators make it clear that they believe that the policies should cover
at least some cases beyond those in which the professor is in a position to evaluate the student.
See DeChiara, supra note 17, at 139 (noting that universities should adopt written rules which
ban all consensual faculty-student relationships that infringe upon the interests of the student
involved or any other parties); Kidd, supra note 67, A2 (quoting Michele Paludi, psychology
professor at Hunter College in New York City, who believes that there is never an appropriate
situation for a professor and student to be sexually intimate).
114. The ambiguity does not always appear to be accidental. In fact, one author suggests
that institutions may adopt a broad "definition of asymmetric relationships hoping to chill risky
relationships without actually having to enforce the ban." Chamallas, supra note 17, at 858. Yet,
there is little attempt tojustify the position that relationships outside the instructional context
are risky enough that we should want to chill them.
115. Keller, supra note 46, at 28 (citations omitted).
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individual or institutional liability."" 6 Another commentator claims
that the seduction of a young woman by a man who has the power to
academically evaluate her, give her recommendations for graduate
school, or expose her to specialized training, often causes the woman
great harm. The student may suffer from profound embarrassment,
self-consciousness and humiliation. As a result, such behavior by a
man in a powerful position can be very "destructive to a woman's
ego." Seductive gestures by professors "constitute mental rape," and((are acts of domination, as despicable as the molestation of the
daughter by the father."" 7 Putting aside whether it really is as
despicable to date an adult student as it is to molest your child,
statements like the above seem totally implausible where the professor
has no direct academic responsibility for the student.
No one would contend that professors should be allowed to extort
sexual favors by threatening adverse academic outcomes for refusal or
promising unearned academic benefits for compliance. That conduct
is already prohibited by institutional sexual harassment policies and
Title IX, and properly exposes the offender to institutional sanctions
as well as criminal and civil liability in appropriate cases."1 8 Conflict
of interest policies also provide adequate protection for students
where the student may feel some subtle coercion although the faculty
member never intended to coerce the student and was unaware of the
student's concerns. 9 Proponents of total bans, however, persist in
arguing that there is a decisive power disparity whether or not the
professor is in a position to evaluate the student.2 ° "Usually, a
student, because of unequal bargaining power and disparity of roles
between a faculty member and a student, will be exploited in any
sexual relationship with a professor. "121
But if the professor is not in a position to evaluate the student, just
what are they bargaining over, and how did the professor gain some
116. Keller, supra note 46, at 28 (citations omitted).
117. Adrienne Rich, Taking Women StudentsSeriously, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENcE 242-43
(1979) (encouraging women teachers to help female students identify and resist the male bias
of education and to teach them on different terms and in a different style, so that the students
can learn in a way more natural to them).
118. Schneider, supra note 52, at 572; Winks, supra note 56, at 466.
119. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing conflict of interest policies rather
than complete bans).
120. Coleman, supra note 69, at 126 (discussing the impact on sexual exploitation when a
professor has direct supervision over a student versus when he does not); Keller, supra note 46,
at 40-41.
121. Connolly & Marshall, supra note 59, at 391 (citation omitted). The relationship is
allegedly no less exploitative just because the student consents to it. Winks, supra note 56, at
444; see also DeChiara, supra note 17, at 141-42 (discussing the factors a student might take into
consideration when entering a relationship with a professor).
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advantage in that negotiation? In what sense is the student being
exploited?122  Why is there always an unstated assumption that
apparently consensual sex between two adults is a benefit to the
professor and a detriment to the student?
Apart from their power over grades, what factors explain the
allegedly overwhelming sex-appeal of middle-aged academics?
Predictably, there is the unsubstantiated contention that age, gender,
prestige of position and "clout at the university" function as some sort
of general aphrodisiac."2 A more "sophisticated" explanation might
be characterized as a structural, institutional, or conspiracy model.
For example, one commentator argues that male professors dominate
in the academic hierarchy. Male professors take a higher position by
virtue of their gender. 24 The "dominant male and the complaisant
woman preserve the structure of the male-centered university."
25
Women who are lower in rank are "perceived as sexually available.
... " The "status overlay" militates against the possibility of an
egalitarian relationship. 126 Further, this alleged sexual availability is
no accident:
The education system, from nursery school through college,
reinforces women's dependency and reliance on authority. Women
are taught submission, not aggression. They learn that being
'good' implies not acting but reacting, not trusting oneself, but
entrusting oneself to the authorities-parents, clergy, teachers-
that promise reward. Forced into a choice between a teacher's
wishes and their own, some students do what they have learned to
do best-defer, submit, agree. In their own peculiar ways, they
once again act out the roles of 'good little girls,' doing what
teacher says is best. 27
Apparently, the authors have no difficulty arguing that these "good
little girls" should distrust their own perceptions about the nature of
122. Early proponents argued that student-teacher relationships are exploitative because
there was no effective consent because "the power imbalance and role disparity are too great."
THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR, supra note 109, at 25. How can we tell how much of a power
imbalance can exist without vitiating consent? Unfortunately for those who find both coercion
and celibacy unacceptable, "true consent demands full equality and full disclosure." THE
LECHEROUS PROFESSOR, supra note 109, at 75.
123. DeChiara, supra note 17, at 141-42.
124. Winks, supra note 56, at 444 (explaining that since male professors are the ones most
often in highly placed positions at a university, students must go to these men for recommen-
dations and other academic needs; as such, these male professors have discretion in determining
what and who is acceptable. This is a very powerful position to have.).
125. Winks, supra note 56, at 444.
126. Winks, supra note 56, at 444 (citations omitted).
127. THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR, supra note 109, at 78.
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a personal relationship and defer to the judgment of institutional
authorities regarding whom they should date.
Given the difficulty of establishing a decisive power imbalance in
the absence of direct academic supervision, it is not surprising that
proponents try to invoke transference to substantiate their claim that
there is a sufficient imbalance of power to invalidate apparent
consent, even where the professor has no formal power over the
student."" Nonetheless, proponents' arguments in support of a
transference phenomenon strong enough to vitiate consent in the
context of a professor-student relationship are less than persuasive.
The tendency to extend the concept of transference beyond its
origin in the psychotherapeutic relationship is not limited to those
who would regulate relationships between teachers and students. In
the context of attorney-client sexual relationships, several commen-
tators have asserted that transference may occur in "any professional
relationship that involves an element of trust."129 Transference in
the teacher-student relationship is said to arise from the fact that
teachers have an "aura of parental power" as well as greater
knowledge of the subject matter and "life in general." ' ° These
factors lead to the development of trust, idealization, and love that
normally would be directed toward a parent. When transference
occurs, those feelings are directed toward a teacher.'
But how persuasive is the notion of transference in the context of
higher education, especially where the professor has no direct
academic responsibility for the student? If we compare this situation
with the psychotherapeutic relationship in which the concept of
transference was developed, there are some rather crucial differences.
Unlike the therapeutic setting, the development and resolution of
transference is not the primary goal of the teacher-student relation-
ship. The student has not sought out the professor because of his
presumed expertise in handling transference, and there is no
suggestion that transference is necessary or even helpful in ac-
complishing the goals of the educational enterprise. Other factors
identified as encouraging the development of transference in the
128. Coleman, supra note 69, at 126-27 (noting that transference does not stop when the
teacher-student relationship ends, unlike in the therapist-patient relationship, because the
student may never know she is experiencing transference and not love).
129. O'Connell, supra note 710, at 920; see also, Livingston, supra note 71, at 45-46 (noting
that clients of lawyers may also experience transference when they develop close and trusting
relationships with each other); Schaffer, supra note 84, at 214 (discussing the benefits of
understanding how transference works and that it is an "essential tool" in the attorney-client
relationship).
130. Coleman, supra note 69, at 120-21.
131. Coleman, supra note 69, at 120-21.
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psychotherapeutic relationship, such as confidentiality, client intimacy
and unilateral self-revelation, do not apply in the academic context.
To argue that "vulnerability" attributable to nothing more than youth,
"power" attributable to nothing more than incrementally greater
information and experience, and "seduction" that consists of nothing
more than "[listening intently" 1 2 adds up to a situation so in-
herently coercive that the most emphatic consent must be dismissed
as ineffective, stretches the notion of exploitation beyond any reason-
able limits. What sexual relationship could ever be consensual under
such a regime?
Ultimately, the proponents of total bans have failed to demonstrate
that there is any reason to question the capacity of adult students to
consent to sexual relationships with professors, at least where the
professor does not exercise academic authority over the student. 3
The proponents of such policies have not shown that a professor's
age, gender, job, or income undercut the student's capacity to
consent.I" They have not shown that the teacher-student relation-
ship results in a form of transference that vitiates consent. They have
not shown that participants in consensual relationships, as distinct
from victims of unwelcome sexual advances, suffer any harm from the
relationship. In addition, they have not shown that universities have
the right, much less the obligation, to limit the ability of adult
students and faculty to determine with whom they will engage in
intimate relationships. The proponents of relationship policies have,
however, garnered support for their incapacity argument from an
unexpected source. Oddly enough, some feminists support the
proposition that adult women should be deemed incapable of giving
effective consent to disfavored sexual relationships.
V. FEMINISM MEANS NEVER SAYING THAT WOMEN ARE, AS A CLASS,
IDIOTS
The belief that women "are deficient in those faculties necessary to
make important decisions"'3 5 has been identified as one source of
discrimination against women. Therefore, it seems incongruous that
women should be urging male dominated institutions to declare
(other) women so incapable of choosing their sexual partners wisely
that their choices should be regulated by the institutions. People who
consider themselves feminists have reached this position through a
132. Jorgenson, Randles & Strasburger, supra note 1, at 657.
133. See infra part V (discussing female students' capacity to consent).
134. See infra part V (conveying the influences of status and income).
135. Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REv. 761, 784 (1990).
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process of trying to identify and protect victims of gender
discrimination. Unfortunately, in their effort to protect all who need
protection, they made the fatal error of presuming that they could
disregard the perceptions and wishes of adult women who have
earned the right to make their own decisions. No matter how well-
intentioned, the restriction of the autonomy of women and the
promotion of the view that women are incapable of making decisions
that men and their institutions are bound to respect is not a feminist
project.
A. "Feminist" Support for Female Incapacity
Feminist support for consensual relationship policies can be traced
to early efforts to address the problem of sexual harassment in higher
education. Title IX 31 was enacted in 1972, and a private cause of
action for injured students was established by 1979.137 Yet, the
existence of a damage remedy was unclear until 1 99 2 .138 Because
only equitable relief was available to a successful litigant prior to 1992,
students had little incentive to pursue Title IX claims. Those who
remained enrolled long enough to avoid having their claims declared
moot by reason of their graduation would still receive little benefit
from the adoption of court-ordered institutional sexual harassment
policies. Consequently, few students victimized by sexual harassment
chose to litigate Title IX claims.
Sexual harassment, however, was prevalent in the academy.139
Students were subjected to repeated propositions from professors,
who were in a position to influence their grades, jobs or academic
opportunities.1" Female students endured unwanted physical
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1995).
137. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (holding that the female
plaintiff has a right under the Education Amendments of 1972 to a private cause of action
against the universities which denied her admission to medical school).
138. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that
monetary damages may be pursued in Title IX violations).
139. See THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR, supra note 109, at 12-15 (citing various survey results
and concluding that 20 to 30% of female students reported being harassed by male faculty).
140. See, e.g., Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the sexual
harassment suit brought by five female students, who complained about male faculty members
and administrators); Cockburn v. Santa Monica Community College Dist. Personnel Comm'n,
207 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Cal. C. App. 1985) (recounting an instructor's repeated embracing and
kissing of a female student who was employed by the instructor as a laboratory assistant); Wexley
v. Michigan State Univ., 821 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (affirming the sanctions against a
tenured professor for making sexual advances to a number of female students); seegerallyTHE
LECHEROUS PROFESSOR, supra note 109 (discussing incidents of sexual harassment that did not
result in litigation).
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contact from professors 41 and even law school deans.142  Students
were asked to allow professors to look up their skirts while they
worked," and offered grade changes in return for oral sex.
144
Women subjected to such indignities were clearly not receiving
educational opportunities equal to those of their male classmates.
Characterizing them as the victims of professional misconduct has
helped stimulate policies to protect them from future victimization.
Feminist faculty worked hard to construct institutional policies
forbidding such misconduct, complete with workable grievance
procedures and meaningful sanctions.
Unfortunately, once sexual harassment policies were in place, some
of the policy creators expanded the "victim" class to include students
engaged in consensual relationships with professors."4 Arguing that
apparent consent is not effective where there is disparity of power
between the parties, they declared that relationships between students
and faculty are so inherently unequal that sexual relationships can
never be truly consensual. 46 Ultimately, this "feminist" position
questions the competency of adult women to choose their own sexual
partners, alleging that women are routinely dominated by the "power"
of individuals of higher status, higher income, greater age and
experience, or simply the male gender.147  To prevent the
exploitation of this class of potential victims, proponents contend that
it is necessary to enact protective regulations that make their sexual
decisions for them.14
141. See e.g., Cockburn, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (recounting an incident involving an 18 year old
student who was sexually assaulted when she began work as a lab assistant); Bustos v. Illinois Inst.
of Cosmetology, 1994 WL 710830 (N.D. I1. Dec. 15, 1994) (alleging that the defendant
president of the school, continually sought "hugs, kisses, gropes and sexual innuendos" to the
point where the student plaintiffs had to withdraw from school); Starishevsky v. Hofstra Univ.,
612 N.Y.S.2d 794,797 n.1 (1994) (recounting a faculty member's kissing of a student at the end
of a training session); see generally THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR, supra note 109 (recounting and
analyzing tales of unwanted sexual advances by professors).
142. See In re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1988) (reciting unwelcome sexual advances by
the dean who touched the student research assistant's waist, rib cage, and hair).
143. Student account in THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR, supra note 109, at 10.
144. See Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, 1994 WL 663596 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18,
1994) (describing a student who discussed her poor grade with the professor who wrote, during
their meeting, "a quick BJ. and your panties," which the student refused).
145. See Carrie N. Baker, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-based Harassment of Students, 43
Emory LJ. 271, 271 n.121 (1994) (stating that "a policy barring all consensual sexual
relationships between students and teachers may impose a chill on other desirable social
interactions").
146. See Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 751,774 (1989) (analyzing the unequal positions ofstudents and professors and examining
the difficult issue of consent).
147. See supra notes 117 and 123-125 and accompanying text.
148. Seesupranote 135 and accompanying text (discussing historical contentions thatwomen
are unable to make key decisions).
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The notion of female incapacity has a long, if not distinguished,
history.'49 The tendency to equate the capacity of women to that
of children or the mentally impaired is not a recent innovation. 50
Schopenhauer wrote that women are "in every respect backward,
lacking in reason and reflection ... a kind of middle step between
the child and the man."151  In Uncommon Law5 2, A.P. Herbert
observed that:
It is probably no mere chance that in our legal text-books the
problems relating to married women are usually considered
immediately after the pages devoted to idiots and lunatics. Indeed,
there is respectable authority for saying that at Common Law this
was the status of a woman...
While that statement was made in jest, married women did in fact
suffer a variety of legal disabilities under the common law. A married
woman's lack of contractual capacity, inability to dispose of property
without the consent of her husband, etc., all resembled the legal
disabilities of the mentally incompetent."M Most legal disabilities of
married women were removed by statute during the mid-nineteenth
century.155  One would assume that, 100 years later, a woman's
ability to enter into a binding contract or to give effective consent to
sexual contact on the same terms as a man would no longer be
questioned. That assumption is generally accurate with respect to
contractual capacity. When it comes to sex, unfortunately, there are
149. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 23-
25 (1988) (discussing the inferiority attributed to women by Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and
Schopenhauer).
150. Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for GenderJustice, 96
YALE LJ. 914, 935 (1987) (book review) (citing Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW 254 (D. Kairys ed., 1982) and Nadine Taub & Liz Schneider, Perspectives
on Women's Subordination and the Role ofLaw, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 117 (D. Kairys ed., 1982).
151. Bender, supra note 149, at 24 (quoting Schopenhauer, On Women in SELECTED ESSAYS
at 338-46 (E.B. Bax ed., 1900)).
152. A.P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW (8th ed. 1969).
153. Id. at 56.
154. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11:1 (4th ed. 1993 &
Supp. 1995) (discussing the capacity of the married woman in contract law and surmising that
historically "common law merged the married woman's identity into that of her husband"). At
common law, a married woman could not bind herself by contract, id. at § 11:2. A married
woman could not transfer title to personal property or alienate real property without the
consent of her husband, id. at § 11:3. These legal incapacities should be compared with those
legal disabilities of lunatics in § 10:2. "The fundamental idea of a contract is that it requires the
assent of two minds. But a lunatic or a person non compos mentis has nothing which the law
recognizes as a mind, and it would seem therefore, upon principle, that he cannot make a
contract which may have any efficacy as such," id. at 225-26 (quoting Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. 9,
21 (15 Wall.) (1872)).
155. WILLISTON, supra note 154, at § 11:3 (noting that a number of statutes addressing the
legal capacity of married women were passed and were collectively known as the married
women's property acts).
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those who are prepared to argue that a woman's apparent consent is
or should be ineffective.
Initiatives to limit the effectiveness of a woman's apparent consent
to sex have drawn the support of both conservative traditionalists and
"new feminists." 15 6 Further, conservatives who advocate traditional
sex roles often use the language of protective feminism.' One
example of traditionalist efforts to limit the effectiveness of a woman's
consent to a sexual relationship is the law of statutory rape. It should
be noted, however, that statutory rape laws limit the effectiveness of
consent given by minors, not adult women. Statutory rape laws
declare minors, specifically female minors,15 incapable of giving
consent to sexual contact with an adult. They were designed to
protect young women "from their own uninformed decisionmaking,
",159 and are based on the premise that young women, unlike young
men, are "legally incapable of consenting to an act of sexual inter-
course.""6 An early justification offered for statutory rape laws was
that they protect society by protecting the virtue of young and
unsophisticated girls.1'6  As recently as 1964, the same court
elaborated upon the reasoning behind such laws,"6 2 holding that the
under-age female is presumed too innocent and naive to comprehend
the nature and consequences of her own sexual conduct.'6 The
young woman's legal incapacity to consent is "explained in part by a
popular conception of the social, moral and personal values that are
preserved by the abstinence from sexual indulgence."'" The court
concluded that because "an unwise disposition of her sexual favor"
156. See Cathy Young, The New Madonna!Whore Syndrome: Feminism, Sexuality, and Sexual
Harassment, 38 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 257, 258 (1993) (stating that sex is the one subject on which
the "new feminist" and the anti-feminists agree, with both groups exploring the relationships of
sex to female victimhood). Professor Young goes on to argue that new feminism, with its
preoccupation with sexual harm, "inevitably mirrors and reinforces traditional paternalism
toward women," and may be properly characterized as "protective feminism," id. at 262.
157. Id. at 276. Another commentator notes that"feminist pronouncements about politically
desirable and undesirable forms of sexuality bear a striking resemblance to those of the
dominant culture." Carol S. Vance, Pleasure and Danger Toward a Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE
AND DANGmER EXPLORING FEmALE SExuALrTY 22 (Carol Vance ed., 1989).
158. Statutory rape laws that forbid sex with female minors, but not male minors, have been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,
450 U.S. 464 (1981).
159. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 496 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
160. MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
161. People v. Verdegreen, 39 P. 607, 609 (Cal. 1895).
162. See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 674 n.1 (Cal. 1964) (stating that the
unsophisticated girl does "harm both to herself and the social mores" when she naively confers
"sexual favors").
163. Id at 674.
164. Id
[Vol. 4:269
GETTING TO YES
harms the young woman herself as well as society in general, the law
of statutory rape intervenes to curb this disposition."
Feminists find it easy to dismiss traditionalist initiatives as "anti-
women." A more troubling set of issues involves support for limiting
the capacity of women to consent to sex on the part of "new
feminists."166 While certainly not "anti-women," and ordinarily not
inclined toward alliances with conservative traditionalists, this group
may be characterized, with some justification, as "anti-sex." As one
commentator notes, "there are those who believe that all sexual
interaction is exploitative - under any circumstances whatsoever."
1 67
Catharine MacKinnon, for example, argues that "coercion is paradig-
matic of heterosexual relations and constitutive of the social meaning
of gender under gender inequality.""6 She claims that under condi-
tions of male dominance it is difficult for women to distinguish
between consensual intercourse and rape, 169 and that consent may
not be a meaningful concept at all. 70 Frances Olsen contends that
there is no clear distinction between consensual and coercive sex
because "the exploitative content of so much of sexuality in our
society pervades all of its forms,"'7 ' and "heterosexual behavior in
our society is seldom fully voluntary; sex is usually to some extent
imposed on females by males."172 New feminists do not uniformly
support the anti-sex initiatives of the conservative traditionalists. They
even lack unanimity in their support of statutory rape laws.'
Conservative traditionalists and new feminists, however, seem to share
an affinity for the public regulation of private decisions. They also
165. Id.
166. See generally Young, supra note 156 (discussing the new feminism as a focus on sexual
harms to women as in pornography and sexual assaults).
167. Irwin N. Perr, Medicolegal Aspects of Professional Sexual Exploitation, in SExuAL EXPLOITA-
TION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 211 (Glenn 0. Gabbard ed., American Psychiatric Press
1989).
168. Abrams, supra note 135, at 763 (citing Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method
and the State: Toward a FeministJurispntdence, 8 SIGNS 65 (1983)).
169. CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 174 (1989).
170. See id. at 178 (noting that "[i]f sex is normally something men do to women, the issue
is less whether there was force than whether consent is a meaningful concept").
171. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387,
402 n.71 (1984).
172. Id. at 428.
173. Still, the arguments against statutory rape laws offered by new feminists are generally
not ringing endorsements of female autonomy and self-direction. For example, one criticism
of statutory rape laws is that outlawing the coercion of particularly vulnerable women may serve
to deflect awareness of the domination and submission that characterizes heterosexuality in
general. Olsen, supra note 171, at 402 n.71.
By isolating those cases in which it is obvious that a young woman had no meaningful choice
and that her sexuality was expropriated, statutory rape laws may pacify women by encouraging
them to believe that their own choices are voluntary and that they are not exploited in their
sexual encounters. Olsen, supra note 171, at 402.
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seem to agree that the decisions of women should be subject to
special regulatory scrutiny. It appears that the main difference
between the traditionalists and the new feminists is that the
traditionalists are reluctant to continue the distinctive legal disabilities
of women past the age of majority, and the new feminists would like
to prohibit as much heterosexual sex as they can get away with.
B. Reclaiming Capacity
In adopting a broad view of incapacity in the face of power
differentials, feminists concede what they most need to contest.
Feminists should not be in the business of reducing the range of
choice available to women, no matter how much they may question
the wisdom of some of the choices that are made. Feminists should
not be in the business of discrediting a woman's own account of her
life and her experience. Feminists should not promote an image of
women as helpless victims incapable of functioning under conditions
of inequality of power. While we must acknowledge existing
inequality, we must also resist it. Resistance requires the capacity for
choice, and for action, under current conditions.
Feminists should remember that the core of feminist thought and
practice is the injunction to listen to women, believe women, respect
women, and empower women. That objective cannot be achieved by
claiming for women the incapacity of children, or of people with
some inherent defect of mind or will that prevents them from taking
responsibility for their actions and entities them to special protection
from their "betters." What must be claimed for women is full
equality, with all of its associated opportunities and responsibilities.
The ultimate goal of all feminist effort is to end the social
subordination of women. 74 That project requires the taking of
responsibility. Adrienne Rich wrote that "[r] esponsibility to yourself
means refusing to let others do your thinking, talking and naming for
you." 75 In pursuit of that personal responsibility:
[f]eminist method starts with the very radical act of taking women
seriously, believing that what we say about ourselves and our
experience is important and valid, even when (or perhaps especially
when) it has little or no relationship to what has been or is being
said about us.' 76
174. Bender, supra note 149, at 4.
175. Adrienne Rich, Claiming an Education in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCES 233 (1979).
176. Littleton, supra note 146, at 764.
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It is especially important that women claim for themselves the right
to define their own sexual experiences and aspirations.
Sexuality has been described as both a fundamental right and a site
of struggle.177 Feminists recognize that one important aspect of self-
determination and self-definition for women is the power to be
"sexually self-defining"--choosing when to have sex and with whom,
defining sexual experience on their own terms, respecting their own
needs and desires. 7 Most women want the freedom to choose
relationships which are based "on mutual respect and care rather than
domination and dependency," and to create public institutions that
honor their choices.179  Women cannot end their social vic-
timization until they are able to imagine themselves as sexual subjects,
people who get to determine "if, when, how, under what circumstan-
ces, with whom or without whom [they have sex] ... .""I0
Sexual harassment is properly prohibited because it is an abuse of
power that involves the victimization and objectivization of
women. 181 Consensual relationship policies, however, do not
necessarily address a situation where there has been an abuse of
power, nor do they increase the power or control of the women they
are allegedly designed to protect. Instead, consensual relationship
policies presume that the women are incapable of exercising
responsible choice, and so deprive them of any choice at all.
Resembling paternalistic measures like curfew regulations and
restrictions on overnight visitation abandoned years ago, consensual
relationship policies "constitute a basic abridgment of the right of
students to be treated as adult members of the community."82 In
a misdirected effort to protect women from themselves, the policies
reinforce and perpetuate the perceived vulnerability of women. If
subordination is the problem, requests for "protection" cannot be the
solution.
177. Vance, supra note 157, at 24.
178. STEVEN SEIDmAN, EMBATTLED EROS: SEXUAL PoLIrICs AND ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 81 (1992) (quoting Sandra Coyner, Women 'sLiberation and SexualLiberation in MARRIAGE
AND ALTERNATi'ES 221 (Roger Libby & Robert Whitehurst eds., 1977)).
179. Finley, supra note 150, at 943.
180. KATHARINE T. BARTLET. GENDER AND LAW 691 (1993) (quoting Michelle Fine & Nancie
Zane, Bein' Wrapped Too Tight: When Low-Income Women Drop Out of High School in DROPOUTS
FROM SCHOOL: ISSUES, DILEMMAS, AND SOLUTiONS 41-42 (Lois Weis, Eleanor Farrar & Hugh G.
Petrie eds., 1989)).
181. Hoffmann, supra note 12, at 113-14. The author argues that sexual harassment is
caused by the relatively disadvantaged status of women, and that its consequences include
lowered self esteem, diminished sense of autonomy, and feelings of lack of control. She
concludes that the solution to the problem of sexual harassment lies in strategies which
.empower women and return control to victims." Hoffman, supra note 12, at 113-14.
182. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 113.
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The fact that consensual relationship policies constrain women
rather than empower them is troubling, as is the fact that such
policies appear to resemble paternalistic regulations that have never
been a positive force for the elimination of subordination. However,
the "incapacity" argument offered by proponents of the policies is far
more troubling, especially when it is represented as a feminist
position. In arguing that women lack the capacity to consent to
particular sexual relationships, and that we may disregard the
woman's own perception that this relationship is one that she has
chosen and continues to value, proponents of consensual relationship
policies disregard a fundamental principle of feminism.'
It is an unforgettable, irreversible and definitive fact of feminist
experience that respect for women's experi-
ence/voice/perception/knowledge, our own and others', is the
ground and foundation of our emancipation .... Thus, it is only by
a violent dishonesty that we could, or can, fail to give credence to
women's voices-even when they differ wildly and conflict.' 84
Catharine MacKinnon states that:
feminism is built on believing women's accounts of sexual use and
abuse by men. The pervasiveness of male sexual violence against
women is therefore not denied, minimized trivialized... or placed
to one side while more important matters are discussed. 85
Unfortunately, proponents of consensual relationship policies are
quite willing to deny, minimize and trivialize the experience of actual
women if that is what it takes to convince the regulators to act.
While it is a serious error for feminists to suggest that women's
credibility should be questioned and their decisions overridden for
their own good, the notion that there is something about women that
renders them incapable of giving consent under conditions of inequali-
ty has implications that are even more problematic. After all, unequal
conditions are the only conditions that we have at the moment.
Moreover, the fact that this incapacity argument is applied primarily
to "women seem[s] to mark them as distinctively impaired."'86
183. Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming. Abstract Equality, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: THE
DIFFERENCE DEBATE 99 (Leslie Goldstein Friedman, ed., 1992). A key element in the subordina-
don of women is that others have defined women's identity and needs. Feminists have
emphasized "listening to what women say, rather than dictating what woman should say and
feel." Id. at 122-23.
184. Marilyn Frye, The Possibility of Feminist Theory, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIvs ON SEXUAL
DFERENCE 177 (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990).
185. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 5-6
(1987).
186. Id. at 326.
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When women workers or students are told that because of their
gender they have less power than men who appear to be their
social equals, or that they should feel demeaned, threatened, and
intimidated when a man shows sexual interest in them, surely that
can have a demoralizing effect.... Assumptions of female passivity
and psychological helplessness cannot fail to have a damaging, if
not devastating, effect on how women are perceived in society. 7
All choice is constrained in one way or another."8 However, "we
ordinarily treat even those people in the grip of inequality as having
rudimentary faculties of responsibility and choice.""8 9 As Schroeder
notes, even if one agrees that "women's lives and sexuality are
extremely constrained in masculinist society,""9 there is still reason
to question the implication that "constrained consent fails to reflect
sufficient voluntarism to make such consent meaningful-that it
imposes no responsibility on the person consenting."1 9' To label all
women as "'powerless' [is] dubious, if not insulting."'9 2  Women
should fight for acknowledgment of their right to choose, not for
protective regulations limiting their choice. To be designated the
"powerless sex" is not very different than to be designated the "weaker
sex."'93 Women must demand the rights and responsibilities of full
citizens, not the disabilities and protection traditionally accorded to
children and the incompetent.
VI. CONCLUSION
No student should be subjected to coercion, intimidation or
unwelcome sexual advances from a professor. Such misconduct is
properly prohibited by institutional sexual harassment policies.
Universities also have a legitimate interest in eliminating the
possibility of unintended coercion, favoritism, and any appearance of
favoritism that compromises the academic integrity of the institution.
Conflict of interest policies address all of those concerns. However,
consensual relationship policies that forbid sexual relationships
between professors and students for whom they have no direct
academic responsibility serve no legitimate institutional interest.
187. Young, supra note 156, at 284.
188. Seidman, supra note 178, at 196.
189. Dan Greenberg & Thomas H. Tobiason, The New Legal Puritanism of Catharine Mac-
Kinnon, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1399 (1993) (citations omitted).
190. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Catharine's Wheek MacKinnon's Pornography Analysis as a Return to
Traditional Christian Sexual Theory, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 225, 237 (1993).
191. Id. (agreeing with Catharine MacKinnon's conception of meaningful consent).
192. Young, supra note 156, at 285.
193. Young, supra note 156, at 285.
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When consensual relationships do not involve sexual conduct that
is unwelcome, banning them does not have any effect on the
institution's liability under Title IX. Proponents have not shown that
students are incapable of consenting to such relationships. In the
absence of any evaluative role for the professor, little justification
exists for the assertion that there is a disparity of power between the
parties sufficient to vitiate consent. There is nothing about either the
parties or the relationship that supports the analogy to the relation-
ship between a psychotherapist and his patient, or that suggests that
such relationships will ordinarily be attributable to the development
and exploitation of transference. There is simply no reason for the
university to treat its adult students as anything less than adults, even
if they happen to be women.
The most pernicious idea to emerge from the debate on consensual
relationship policies is the notion that feminists should be in the
business of questioning the capacity of women, limiting the choices
available to women, or urging institutions to disregard the testimony
of women about their lives, their aspirations, and their emotional
commitments. The goal of feminist efforts is to eliminate the
subordination of women in our society. To argue that women should
be treated as though they were children or incompetents-two of the
very few groups in our society that are even more subordinated than
women-is to take a step in the wrong direction. To contend that
"power differentials" generate this incapacity would make the consen-
sual capacity of women suspect in many if not most sexual relation-
ships. The idea that women cannot acclimate to the rigors of
professional life has been decisively rejected only recently. Feminists
should not put forth the proposition that women are unsuited to the
rigors of a personal life. Once generated, it is unlikely that the
notion of incapacity can be easily contained. The students I have
been privileged to teach deserve much better from those who
presume to speak on their behalf.
